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Armed Violence in the Llanos Orientales Region Following the
Signing of the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP in Colombia
Abstract
A fundamental aspect in the study of the Colombian armed conflict is related to the
violence produced in the country after the signing of the Peace Agreement with the FARCEP guerrillas in November 2016. To this end, we attempt to analyze the transformation of
the relationship between the perpetrators of violence and their territory, taking as a case
study a region particularly affected by the conflict, as is Llanos Orientales (known in
English as the Eastern Plains). Starting with a preliminary characterization of the most
relevant armed groups – post-paramilitary groups, FARC-EP dissidents and ELN guerrillas –
we attempt to analyze the changes and continuities of their armed presence and the
symbolic, structural and institutional aspects that explain their territorial distribution in
this part of the country. In this way, the presence of the former FARC-EP and concurring
factors such as the coca trade, oil industry and poverty are aspects that should be
considered in order to understand the shifting geometry of violence.
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Introduction
Colombia's Llanos Orientales region has experienced deep social unrest
since it was colonized at the beginning of the 20th century and has
witnessed protracted armed conflicts and numerous peace initiatives in
its territory.1 Such a situation was, naturally, linked to the internal
armed conflict, so the signing of the Peace Agreement in November
2016 formally marked the end of armed violence with the guerrilla of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (FARCEP), and specifically, with the armed activism of its most powerful
structure: The Eastern Bloc.2 The Agreement aspired to build stable
and lasting peace throughout the country, and specifically in those
regions hardest hit by an armed conflict that had lasted more than half
a century and was possibly the most virulent of its kind on the
continent.3 However, be it due to the continuity of factors linked to the
illicit economy associated with violence; the lack of structural and
institutional transformations pursued, in part, by the Agreement;
delays in the implementation agenda; or the proliferation of different
armed dissident groups, the end of the violence is far from becoming a
reality.4
In this regard, several works have focused on analyzing the
shortcomings of an implementation with a strong territorial
component. This, highlighting both structural and institutional
factors.5 On the other hand, equally, a wide literature has tried to
explain, from different points of view, the dynamics of reproduction of
violence associated with new and old armed groups -in the form of
guerrillas, post-paramilitary groups or dissidents of the former FARCEP. 6 Thus, five years on from the signing of the Peace Agreement, this
article aims to characterize and explain the dynamics of territorial
violence that have accumulated in recent years in one of the regions
with the longest tradition of violence in Colombia: Llanos Orientales.
However, this analysis must continue in other studies with which to
enrich the academic production on the explanatory factors of violence
since the Agreement with the FARC-EP.
The organization of this article is in three sections. First, is a
preliminary description of the armed groups in the region. Second is a
presentation of the armed groups strategic positioning and, finally, an
exercise in causality is proposed to test whether four hypotheses hold
true. According to Wood, emerging violence in post-armed conflicts,
responds to a political culture of values, norms, practices, and beliefs in
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a process of continuous recreation, although it seeks to maintain
certain essential elements as its own, to strengthen aspects such as
recognition and legitimacy.7 In accordance with the above, a first
hypothesis would be:
H1: Armed groups will seek to establish themselves in those
municipalities where the Eastern Bloc was present
Moreover, structural aspects in the transformation of violence are
fundamental to understanding any process of overcoming the violence.
This classic approach outlined by Galtung is used in peace and conflict
resolution research, and is addressed in Colombia as an aspect to
consider in the presence of armed groups in certain settings.8
Accordingly, a second hypothesis would be:
H2: Armed groups will seek to establish themselves in those
municipalities where structural violence
(poverty/unemployment) is most prevalent.
This approach, developed around the notion of structural violence, has
also allowed us to understand how certain illicit economies take root
and become formalized.9 According to Pécaut or Ríos, the duration and
virulence of the armed conflict would not have been so great had there
not been huge economic benefits derived from the coca trade, illegal
mining, or oil exploitation.10 These three items, and others such as the
control of monocultures, especially in relation to the paramilitary, have
been fundamental in the financing of all existing armed groups in
Colombia.11 Hence, a third hypothesis would be:
H3: Armed groups are in municipalities where coca leaf
cultivation, mining or oil exploitation are present
Finally, according to the theory postulated by Lederach, and as
highlighted by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz in one of its many
studies, effective peace agreement implementation policies play a
fundamental role in displacing and mitigating the presence of armed
groups in each territory.12 These types of elements areaddressed in the
Peace Agreement signed with the FARC-EP through the so-called
Development Programs with a Territorial-based Approach (PDET),
which have sought to prioritize certain territories in the
implementation of the Agreement. After five years, it is time to examine
the real scope of such programs and observe if there is mitigation of
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armed activism where they are implemented in the Llanos Orientales
region, by assigning a value of 0 (absence) or 1 (presence). Thus, the
fourth hypothesis would be as follows:
H4: Armed groups are not located in municipalities where the
Peace Agreement PDETs have been most implemented and
developed
The data used for this work derive from different sources of
information. First, the location of armed groups comes from the
periodic reports issued by reference foundations that have monitored
the armed conflict and Peace Agreement implementation, such as
Indepaz, Ideas for Peace Foundation or Peace and Reconciliation
Foundation.13 Data related to the presence of illicit mining, the oil
industry or coca cultivation are from the Terridata database, while
poverty and unemployment indicators are from the National Planning
Department. In addition, the maps have been self-made using QGIS,
while the proposed statistical processing was carried out with the
STATA 17 program, based on a dataset from November 2016 to
November 2020, with a total of 316 observations of acts of violence in
all the municipalities of the Llanos Orientales region.14 For practical
purposes, this region is defined on the basis of the politicaladministrative criterion delimited by the Colombian legal system, for
which Llanos Orientales comprises the departments of Meta, Caquetá,
Casanare, Guaviare and Vichada. A macro-region that, at all events, has
been a place of great relevance for the FARC-EP, since its main center
of operations (Casa Verde) was located there, promoting the La Uribe
Agreements (1984), with President Belisario Betancur, developing the
Caguán negotiation process with President Andrés Pastrana (19992002), or hosting the last major FARC-EP conference – the tenth – in
which the final signing of the Peace Agreement with the government of
Juan Manuel Santos was accepted from the Llanos del Yarí.

Territorial Presence and Armed Actions in the Llanos
Orientales
When the Eastern Bloc and almost all its 56-armed structures agreed to
surrender their arms, a transformation process began on the part of the
perpetrators of the violence. First, taking advantage of the power
vacuum left by the FARC-EP in the territory, different paramilitary
successor groups, such as the Clan del Golfo, Los Puntilleros, Los
Caqueteños, Nuevo Renacer AUC and Águilas Negras, consolidated
64
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their position in the department. Likewise, several new groups emerged
that tried to function as a continuation of the FARC-EP, either because
they continued to engage in violence or because they dissociated
themselves from the Peace Agreement. These include the 1st, 7th, 10th,
14th, 15th, 28th, 40th or 62nd Fronts, along with the 'Acacio Medina'
Front and the National Liberation Army (ELN). 15
Since 2016, the Clan del Golfo has been active in the municipalities of
Acacías, Barranca de Upía, Fuente de Oro, Granada, Lejanías,
Mapiripán, Puerto Lleras, Puerto Rico, San Juan de Amara, San Martín
Villavicencio, and Vista Hermosa in Meta, Yopal and Villanueva in
Casanare, San José del Guaviare, Miraflores, Calamar and El Retorno
in Guaviare (see Figue 1).16 Their choice of position was based on the
control of access routes (both land and river) from Vichada and
Guaviare to the Venezuelan border in Arauca, especially in what is
known as the Piedemonte Llanero (plains foothills). From 2018 to
2020, their presence in the territory decreased significantly from 18 to
11 municipalities, although they continued to maintain control of
strategic routes.
Figure 1. Armed groups in the Llanos Orientales region, 2016-2019

Prepared by the authors

Los Puntilleros have also been operating in the region since 2016.
Although initially present in some twenty municipalities, their presence
is reduced over the years to almost half, despite strengthening their
position in the control of the Meta River, from the plain’s foothills to
the Venezuelan border, especially in the municipality of Puerto
Carreño. The same has occurred regarding the Guaviare River, between
the municipalities of Puerto Concordia and Mapiripán.17 Meanwhile, in
2016, the Nuevo Renacer AUC group gained notoriety, especially in the
65
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss3/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.3.2005

Gómez Triana and Ríos: Armed Violence in the Llanos Orientales Region

department of Caquetá (in the municipalities of Cartagena del Chairá,
El Paujil, El Doncello or San Vicente del Cagúan), although not long
after this group disappeared. Much the same has happened with Los
Caqueteños, who were operating almost exclusively around the
departmental capital of Florencia in 2017. However, now they are
integrated in other criminal groups.18 Thus, given these circumstances,
since 2016 and up to the present, there has been a special interest in
controlling the plains foothills, in their proximity to the natural parks
and the border with Venezuela. To this end, control of land and river
traffic has become key to the positioning strategy of these groups, with
the Clan del Golfo predominantly in control from Guaviare (coca
production) to Arauca (distribution). Meanwhile, Los Puntilleros have
tried to maintain a certain presence in Guaviare, although their control
route goes towards the Venezuelan border, through Vichada and over
the plain’s foothills.19
In terms of guerrilla structures, the former FARC-EP's 1st Front is the
one that has been most active in the region, reaching as many as 16
municipalities in 2017, although its presence has been declining over
the years. However, this tendency does not extend to other structures,
such as the 10th Front, which has shown greater stability in armed
activism in the changing scenario of the plains, in which, as can be seen
from the following table, an important level of fluctuation takes place
(see Figure 2). This is because in 2018 there is an expansion phase of
armed groups, but by contrast, since 2019, their strategic positioning
and distribution has been consolidated, especially in National Natural
Parks, border locations with Venezuela and areas where the FARC-EP
has been present for a long time.20
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Figure 2. Presence of former FARC-EP Fronts in municipalities in the
Llanos Orientales region, 2016-2020
2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Frente
10

Frente
14

Frente
15

Frente
28

Frente
40

16

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Frente
1

Frente
7

Frente
62

Frente
Acacio
Medina

Source: Prepared by the authors
In relation to the above, a fact that is particularly striking is how FARCEP dissident Fronts have in fact co-opted a large part of the power
spaces left by the demobilization of the Eastern Bloc throughout 2017.
Data can illustrate this statement by comparing (left) the map drawn
up by the Ideas for Peace Foundation in 2012 and (right) the one
created for this article, as shown in the following figure. There is a high
level of correspondence that allows us to understand the spatial
distribution criteria of FARC-EP dissidents on the geography of
violence which is currently taking place in the macro-region of Llanos
Orientales (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Presence of armed groups related to the FARC-EP, 2012-2019

Source: Ideas for Peace Foundation (left/free and open access); prepared by
the authors (right).

Finally, contrary to what might be expected, the ELN, and specifically
its main structure operating in Llanos Orientales, namely the Eastern
War Front, has not increased its area of influence because of the power
vacuum created by the demobilization of the FARC-EP. While it is true
that in 2019 it tried to expand its presence on the Venezuelan border in
the department of Vichada – and even in some municipalities of Meta –
its position only appears in those locations where it is most deeply
rooted and has the greatest guerrilla capacity: In the departments of
Arauca and Casanare21.
Thus, based on the previous characterization of the enclaves and actors
of violence in Llanos Orientales, there is a clear connection between all
the armed groups – post-paramilitary groups, FARC-EP dissidents and
the ELN – and the different possibilities of illicit financing available in
the region, especially oil exploitation and coca cultivation. Added to
this is the combination of communication routes to facilitate illegal
economy pathways and other associated factors, which will be included
in the analysis below, such as deforestation practices linked to the
expansion of the agricultural frontier driven by the profit motive and
the ongoing process of land dispossession (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Geography of violence in Llanos Orientales, 2020

Prepared by the authors

Analysis and results
The econometric model used to test the different hypotheses proposed
at the beginning of this article is the Binomial Logit Model, which is an
estimation technique for equations whose dependent variable is a
dummy variable (whose value can be 0 – there are no armed groups, or
1 – there are armed groups). This avoids the problem of
unboundedness of the linear probability model by using a variant of the
cumulative logistic function as proposed by Studemund22. An
additional reason is that this model allows the multilevel structure
(municipalities) using time series (2016-2020), so that the equation
would be:
L : Pr (𝐷𝑖 = 1 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡 𝑋𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡 𝑋2𝑖𝑡

69
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss3/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.3.2005

Gómez Triana and Ríos: Armed Violence in the Llanos Orientales Region

Where 𝐷𝑖 is the dependent variable corresponding to the presence or
absence of armed groups; 𝑋𝑙𝑖 are the independent variables; 𝑡 refers to
observations on each municipality at multiple points in time using a
time-series approach. That said, Table 1 presents the first model used
to explain the presence of armed groups, and the confidence interval
used for this model is 0.95.
Surprisingly, if the explanatory model is applied overall, without
differentiating between armed groups, the former presence of the
FARC-EP, for example, did not appear to be statistically significant (Z=
0.760). Probably, this is because the violence of other organizations,
such as the paramilitary successor groups, was not directly related to
the former guerrillas, and their presence in the territory was due to
other causes existing in the municipalities. On the other hand, the
poverty variable was statistically significant (0.006), with a high
coefficient, so that, all other variables being constant, it acted as a
powerful predictor of the presence of armed groups in the
municipalities of Llanos Orientales. Likewise, the presence of wax
palm, as one of the crops associated with the economics of land
dispossession, did show a significant value, with a high coefficient,
which suggested that a plantation of this type could increase the
probability of armed groups being present in the area. Finally, none of
the other variables highlighted from in this article turned out to be
significant for this model showing the overall pattern.
Table 1. Regression on factors explaining the presence of armed groups

Prepared by the authors based on STATA
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As documented for the Colombian case, and in particular regarding
Llanos Orientales, it would be a methodological error to analyze the
presence of armed groups in terms of univocity, as a detailed analysis is
essential to differentiate between post-paramilitary groups, groups that
are heirs of the FARC-EP, and the ELN. This is because their
relationship with the territory responds to a trajectory, rationale and
specific idiosyncrasies that are as unique as they are, on many
occasions, different from each other. For instance, attending
specifically at the process of former FARC-EP dissidents (see Table 2),
it is possible to see how explanatory power is greater was increased by
the presence of former Eastern Bloc structures (Z: 0.021). However,
due to high multicollinearity between enclaves where the FARC-EP
were located and where coca cultivation was present (0.7492 - Table 3),
had to eliminate the previous existence of the FARC-EP Fronts and the
PDETs to establish whether coca cultivation had an impact on the
presence of rearmed and dissident groups.
Table 2. Regression on FARC-EP dissidents

Prepared by the authors based on STATA
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Table 3. Model 2 statistical correlation

Prepared by the authors based on STATA

Continuing with the explanation, the data in Table 4 below show that
the variables of coca cultivation, poverty and population density were
statistically highly significant. However, the coefficients for the latter
variable were not sufficiently relevant to explain the presence of armed
groups that are carrying on from the guerrillas. On the other hand, the
co-existence of coca cultivation and high levels of poverty did operate
as an important predictor to explain the presence of groups that are
heirs of the FARC-EP in different municipalities of Llanos Orientales.
Table 4. Regression on FARC-EP dissidents (Model 2)

Prepared by the authors based on STATA

The proposed model of analysis again presented particularities
regarding the paramilitary successor organizations (see Table 5). Once
again, poverty was statistically significant, while population density was
only marginally so. Wax palm cultivation was also an important factor,
as it was significant and had a high coefficient. Put another way, the
presence of FARC-EP dissident and rearmed groups and paramilitary
groups could the same element explain both, so one might think that
either disputes or cooperation existed in such settings. Finally, the
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presence of PDETs was statistically significant, with a high coefficient,
but with a negative value, meaning that there was less likelihood that
these groups were present in those municipalities prioritized by the
Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, it was not possible to determine
whether this was due to the progress of the implementation process
and transformation of the violence, or to the better starting position of
groups that inherited sites where the FARC-EP had once held control of
the territory.
Table 5. Regression on paramilitary successor groups

Prepared by the authors based on STATA

Finally, regarding the ELN, the presence of coca leaf cultivation, oil
production, population density, wax palm cultivation, and the presence
of FARC-EP dissidents was relevant. Coca leaf or wax palm cultivation
yielded a high coefficient with a negative value, so could assume that
there was less likelihood of the ELN being in a municipality with coca
leaf or palm oil production. However, they were more likely to be in
places where there was oil exploitation, tying in with their idiosyncrasy
of financing themselves with revenues gained from extorting the
extractive industry. The presence of FARC-EP dissidents showed a
positive coefficient, which can be as indicator of enclaves where a
rationale for cooperation existed between the different armed groups
(see Table 6).
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Table 6. Regression on the ELN

Prepared by the authors based on STATA

Discussion
There are three lessons from the models presented in this article. The
first is that the dynamics of armed groups in the region of Llanos
Orientales after the signing of the Peace Agreement are diverse and
need to differentiate methodologically when it comes to their study.
The second noteworthy feature is that the greater the poverty in the
municipalities, the more likely armed groups will be present. However,
this variable does not operate in isolation, since it is based on the
various resources that the different groups are able to exploit, as in the
case of coca leaf cultivation by FARC-EP dissidents, oil exploitation by
the ELN, or wax palm cultivation by the paramilitary successor groups.
The third lesson is that in this region of the country, mining
exploitation or employment rates are irrelevant when explaining the
presence of violent groups.
For testing the hypotheses, H1 stated at the beginning of this article is
partially true. That is, although the former presence of the Eastern Bloc
accounted for the presence of the FARC-EP's rearmed and dissident
groups, it failed to do so for the paramilitary successor groups or the
ELN. On the other hand, H2 is proved partially. Poverty was a
statistically significant variable with a high coefficient for all the armed
groups studied. Thus, when the rate of poverty was higher, armed
groups were more likely to be present. However, when talking about
unemployment, this variable was not relevant, possibly because
unemployment is a proxy for poverty, and due to the lack of existing
74
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data, since the only available measurement was the formal employment
rate in municipalities for 2016, with a statistical projection made by the
DANE for subsequent years. In other words, no robust or reliable data
were available to conclude that unemployment was unrelated to armed
groups being present in the region.
H3 is validated for the FARC-EP’s rearmed and dissident groups, in
relation to coca cultivation, and for the ELN in relation to oil
production. However, mining in the region was not significant enough
to explain the presence of armed groups. H3 had no explanatory power
to account for the presence of paramilitary successor groups. Finally,
those municipalities where there are PDET programs implemented
were only negatively significant in explaining the non-presence of
paramilitary successor groups, possibly also due to the presence of
dissident or rearmed groups.
Whatever the case, it is important to highlight that the models
presented were built from a codebook constructed exclusively for this
research based on 316 observations made between November 2016 and
November 2020. However, there are some limitations. First, the
precarious or non-existent information at the municipal level in
Colombia greatly hampered any statistical study. The most complete
and reliable source was Terridata, but information about some
municipalities was simply missing for periods of years (up to 10 years).
The only detailed statistical information provided is for the country's
most populated cities, while the rest was based on departmental
estimates. Moreover, quantitative studies explaining the dynamics of
violence in Colombia are quite limited, so determining the relevance of
variables, data and econometric models poses a challenge that calls for
greater monitoring, accessibility and transparency of sources provided
by the National Police or the Ministry of Defense, highly opaque
institutions in terms of making information available. Finally, the
period analyzed in this article is only five years, so detailed studies on
the presence and dynamics of violence in regional settings is a
promising field to pursue. This is because they can provide a rigorous
understanding of the markedly heterogeneous violence in the territory,
especially after the signing of the Peace Agreement.

Conclusion
This article has studied the presence of armed groups in the Llanos
Orientales region following the Peace Agreement in 2016 and up to
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2020. During this period, multiple illegal armed groups were operating
in the region, such as the Clan del Golfo, Los Puntilleros, Los
Caqueteños, Nuevo Renacer AUC, Las Águilas Negras, the ELN and the
former FARC-EP's 1st, 7th, 10th, 14th, 15th, 28th, 40th, 62nd and
Acacio Medina Fronts. The different structures were grouped into three
categories for a more detailed analysis: Successors of the paramilitary,
the FARC-EP’s successor groups and the ELN. This article has taken a
descriptive approach, using maps and specialized literature to describe
the armed groups and their dynamics in the region, and a causal
approach based on a quantitative study was proposed to explain their
presence in the region.
In the first part, it described the groups that arrived in the region after
the signing of the Peace Agreement with the FARC-EP, affecting, above
all, the dissident and rearmed groups of the demobilized guerrillas.
This is because these were newly-created groups as opposed to existing
ones, such as the ELN or the post-paramilitary groups, which have
undergone an entire reorganization process, and are under permanent
transformation. Based on the presence of each armed group, four
hypotheses are tested and analyzed using a binomial logit model.
Arguments linking the persistence of the conflict to structural elements,
according to the proposed model, allow us to highlight that poverty is a
determining and significant factor in explaining the widespread
presence of armed groups, regardless of their aliases and
nomenclatures. However, when one tries to go further and integrate
possible sources of illicit financing, not all taxable resources by armed
groups have the same impact. Coca cultivation is of great relevance in
explaining the position of dissidents who continue in the armed
activism of the FARC-EP, while the exploitation of the oil industry
helps explain the presence of the ELN. Likewise, palm cultivation is
especially significant in relation to the presence of post-paramilitary
groups, given that mining, for example, is not a statistically significant
factor in explaining the presence or absence of an armed group.
In terms of the symbolic and cultural aspects associated with the
continuity of an armed group after its initial demobilization, the model
has shown that it is in those municipalities where the FARC-EP has
traditionally been present where there are the greatest number of
dissidents from this former guerrilla group. This is important to
identify explanatory variables other than the existence of conditions of
poverty or benefits derived from the illicit economy. Thus, wherever the
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FARC-EP's Eastern Bloc was present, the territories under its control
have never fallen into the hands of other groups such as postparamilitary groups or the ELN. This is a highly relevant factor in that
the dissident structures derived from the FARC-EP may attempt to
confer continuity with respect to the former in terms of their own
elements of discourse and strategy.
However, it must be an emphasize on the limited availability of data
and the need to complement this type of work with other equally
essential studies that analyze in detail the desertion factor among the
FARC-EP demobilized population or the relationship between different
armed groups. For example, it is not possible to know how many excombatants have made the transition to illegality or what the rationale
for conflict and/or cooperation has been like between armed structures
whose activism were marked by circumstances as changeable as they
are strictly local.
Thus, this study calls for further detailed analyses that attempt to
characterize separately the aspects that accompany each armed group
in their particular use of violence. This will enable us to better explain
the relationship of these armed groups with their territory and optimize
our understanding of the violence in a post-Peace Agreement scenario
in Colombia.
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